- "On Some Leibnizian Arguments for the Principle of Sufficient Reason," History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (2): 143-162. 2020. [final version]
Short abstract: I examine some early arguments that Leibniz gives for the Principle of Sufficient Reason and conclude that either they're circular, yield a version of the principle that is highly counter-intuitive, or yield a version of the principle which is nearly trivial.
- "Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds," forthcoming in Journal of Scottish Philosophy [draft]
Short abstract: I argue that Thomas Reid was a kind of quasi-realist about natural kinds, in a way that allows him both to hang onto a kind of conventionalism about natural kind terms and to justify the success of inductive inferences featuring these kinds.
Nothing to see here yet!
- A paper on the connection between Spinoza's epistemology and his philosophy of experiment [draft]
Short abstract: I give an interpretation of Spinoza's epistemology of experiment upon which he thinks that the experimental method cannot achieve the aims of true science.
- A paper on priority monism [draft]
Short abstract: I argue that the priority monist is committed to the view that the only concrete objects which possibly exist are those which actually exist, and these exist necessarily.
- A paper on the principle of sufficient reason [draft]
Short abstract: I argue that if you believe in negative facts, you should believe in the principle of sufficient reason.
- Paper on Spinoza's views on space and motion
- Paper on Descartes, Spinoza, and Suarez on inanimate teleology
- Paper on Spinoza's conception of scientific explanation
- Paper on Spinoza's rejection of telological explanations
- Paper on Spinoza's on the applicability of mathematical concepts
- Paper on Isaac Barrow's solutions to paradoxes of infinite divisibility
- Paper on the relationship between priority and substance monism
- Paper arguing that grounding is not metaphysical explanation
- Paper arguing that if you believe in social construction, you shouldn't be a physicalist